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this prevents fake proofs from getting into the tx pool
illuzen
approved these changes
Mar 23, 2026
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this prevents fake proofs from getting into the chain
Wormhole proof pre-validation before transaction pool entry
Unsigned wormhole proof extrinsics previously only checked for non-empty bytes before entering the tx pool, making it trivial to DDoS by spamming random byte sequences.
Changes
Extract
pre_validate_proofhelper in the wormhole pallet that runs all cheap checks -- proof deserialization against circuit common data, public input parsing, asset ID, volume fee rate, block hash existence/match, and nullifier replay -- and call it from bothvalidate_unsigned(pool gating) and the dispatch function (defense-in-depth), eliminating duplicated validation logic.What this prevents
Random bytes and malformed proofs are now rejected at pool entry before propagation. Deserialization against the circuit's
CommonCircuitDatais the strongest filter -- an attacker would need to reverse-engineer the embedded circuit structure just to get past it. The full ZK verification remains at dispatch time only to avoid becoming a CPU-exhaustion vector itself.