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fix(security): harden Live Components against critical vulnerabilities#63

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MarcosBrendonDePaula merged 1 commit intomainfrom
claude/analyze-live-components-security-4n1pz
Feb 21, 2026
Merged

fix(security): harden Live Components against critical vulnerabilities#63
MarcosBrendonDePaula merged 1 commit intomainfrom
claude/analyze-live-components-security-4n1pz

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Fixes multiple security vulnerabilities in the Live Components system:

CRITICAL:

  • Block arbitrary method execution via executeAction (CWE-94): add blocklist
    of internal methods + support for publicActions whitelist on components
  • Prevent cross-component rehydration (CWE-434): embed and validate
    __componentName in signed state to detect state tampering

HIGH:

  • Add per-connection WebSocket rate limiting (CWE-770): token bucket algorithm
    prevents message flooding/DoS
  • Restrict file uploads (CWE-434): MIME type allowlist, blocked extensions,
    50MB max size (was 500MB), UUID-based filenames, path traversal prevention
  • Add room authorization checks (CWE-269): enforce liveAuthManager.authorizeRoom
    on ROOM_JOIN, prevent client from setting initial room state

MEDIUM:

  • Use crypto.randomUUID() for component and connection IDs (CWE-287)
  • Validate room names with regex (CWE-20): block path traversal and injection
  • Add room state size limits of 10MB (CWE-770)
  • Log auth failures instead of silently ignoring (CWE-391)
  • Remove stack traces and available component names from error messages (CWE-209)

Includes 65 new security attack tests validating all fixes.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01BAtMnYwE3T7k6F569Y4JS4

Fixes multiple security vulnerabilities in the Live Components system:

CRITICAL:
- Block arbitrary method execution via executeAction (CWE-94): add blocklist
  of internal methods + support for publicActions whitelist on components
- Prevent cross-component rehydration (CWE-434): embed and validate
  __componentName in signed state to detect state tampering

HIGH:
- Add per-connection WebSocket rate limiting (CWE-770): token bucket algorithm
  prevents message flooding/DoS
- Restrict file uploads (CWE-434): MIME type allowlist, blocked extensions,
  50MB max size (was 500MB), UUID-based filenames, path traversal prevention
- Add room authorization checks (CWE-269): enforce liveAuthManager.authorizeRoom
  on ROOM_JOIN, prevent client from setting initial room state

MEDIUM:
- Use crypto.randomUUID() for component and connection IDs (CWE-287)
- Validate room names with regex (CWE-20): block path traversal and injection
- Add room state size limits of 10MB (CWE-770)
- Log auth failures instead of silently ignoring (CWE-391)
- Remove stack traces and available component names from error messages (CWE-209)

Includes 65 new security attack tests validating all fixes.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01BAtMnYwE3T7k6F569Y4JS4
@MarcosBrendonDePaula MarcosBrendonDePaula merged commit 18521d4 into main Feb 21, 2026
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2 participants