diff --git a/ai/security_report_2025-01-24_blog-eletrix-fr.md b/ai/security_report_2025-01-24_blog-eletrix-fr.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af5b46b --- /dev/null +++ b/ai/security_report_2025-01-24_blog-eletrix-fr.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +==== + +Auto Security Analysis of blog-eletrix-fr at 2025-01-24 + +CRITICAL - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) +The application allows users to create blog posts containing arbitrary HTML and JavaScript. When these posts are viewed, the content is rendered using the Jinja2 `|safe` filter, which disables auto-escaping. This allows an attacker to execute malicious scripts in the context of any user viewing the post, potentially leading to session hijacking or unauthorized actions. + +PoC +```python +import requests + +# Assuming the attacker has access to create a post (or via CSRF) +session = requests.Session() +# Login if necessary, or exploit missing CSRF +session.post("http://127.0.0.1:5000/login", data={"username": "admin", "password": "admin"}) +session.post("http://127.0.0.1:5000/create_post", data={ + "title": "Malicious Post", + "author": "Attacker", + "tags": "test", + "content": "" +}) + +# When any user visits /post/Malicious%20Post, the script will execute. +r = requests.get("http://127.0.0.1:5000/post/Malicious%20Post") +if "" in r.text: + print("XSS Vulnerability Confirmed") +``` + +Fix +Remove the `|safe` filter from `html/post.html` and use a dedicated library like `bleach` to sanitize the HTML output of `markdown2` before passing it to the template. + +--- + +MEDIUM - Missing CSRF Protection +The application lacks Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection on state-changing routes such as `/login`, `/create_post`, and `/upload`. An attacker can trick a logged-in administrator into performing actions like creating a malicious post or uploading files by enticing them to visit a specially crafted website. + +PoC +```python +# A simple HTML form hosted on an attacker's site can trigger a post creation +#
+# +# ... +# +#
+# +``` + +Fix +Implement CSRF protection using a library like `Flask-WTF` or `Flask-SeaSurf`. Ensure every state-changing request (POST, PUT, DELETE) requires a valid CSRF token. + +--- + +MEDIUM - Path Traversal +The `/post/` route uses `os.path.join` with the user-controlled `name` parameter to construct a file path. While Flask's default routing may limit some traversal attempts, the code itself is vulnerable. If an attacker can bypass routing restrictions, they could potentially read any `.md` file on the filesystem that the application has access to. + +PoC +```python +import requests +# Example attempt to read a file outside the articles directory +# This may depend on the server environment and routing configuration +r = requests.get("http://127.0.0.1:5000/post/..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd") +``` + +Fix +Validate that the requested `name` does not contain directory traversal sequences (like `..`) and ensure the resulting path stays within the intended directory. Use `werkzeug.utils.secure_filename` or verify the absolute path. + +--- + +LOW - IP Spoofing via 'CF-Real-IP' Header +The application's context processor trusts the `CF-Real-IP` header to identify the user's IP address. If the application is not behind a Cloudflare proxy that strips this header from untrusted sources, an attacker can spoof their IP address by providing a custom `CF-Real-IP` header. + +PoC +```python +import requests +headers = {'CF-Real-IP': '1.2.3.4'} +r = requests.get("http://127.0.0.1:5000/", headers=headers) +# The application will now believe the user's IP is 1.2.3.4 +``` + +Fix +Only trust headers like `CF-Real-IP` or `X-Forwarded-For` if the application is known to be behind a trusted proxy. Configure the application to use a middleware like `ProxyFix` from Werkzeug with proper configuration. + +==== + +Summary: + +| Severity | Exploit Name | +| :--- | :--- | +| CRITICAL | Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) | +| MEDIUM | Missing CSRF Protection | +| MEDIUM | Path Traversal | +| LOW | IP Spoofing via 'CF-Real-IP' Header |