-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
Open
Labels
enhancementNew feature or requestNew feature or requestsecuritySecurity planning and remediationSecurity planning and remediation
Description
Objective
Run a single, evidence-based security mapping program across the ecosystem (not limited to 1Password Connect) to establish risk visibility, ownership, and a prioritized remediation backlog.
Scope
- Orgs/repos:
chittyos,chittyapps,chittyfoundation,chittycorp,furnished-condos - Layers:
- Identity and secrets (1Password Connect/service accounts, token flows, rotation paths)
- CI/CD controls (branch protection, required checks, SCA, secret scanning, provenance)
- Application and API authz/authn boundaries (MCP gateways, service-to-service trust)
- Data stores and custody (Neon, D1, KV, R2, backups, encryption, retention)
- Runtime/network exposure (Cloudflare routes, workers, containers, ingress, egress)
- Observability and incident response readiness
Deliverables
- Security topology map (systems, trust boundaries, identity edges)
- Control matrix by repo/service (implemented vs missing)
- Risk register with severity, blast radius, owner, and due date
- Prioritized remediation plan (P0/P1/P2) with implementation tickets
- Verification checklist and recurring review cadence
Workstreams
WS1Asset inventory and dependency graphWS2Identity/secrets mapping (human + machine credentials)WS3CI/CD and SDLC control mappingWS4Runtime and data-plane hardening mapWS5Threat scenarios + abuse path validationWS6Remediation execution and closure evidence
Acceptance Criteria
- 100% repo inventory with owner + criticality classification
- Token/secret flows documented for all production services
- CI security gates defined and enforced for all active repos
- P0 findings have owner + due date + validation criteria
- Leadership-ready summary with residual risk statement
Initial P0 Focus
- Service-token strategy (non-interactive, least-privilege, rotation tested)
- Secrets exposure prevention (history scan + CI secret gates)
- Durable auth boundaries for MCP/service ingress
- Baseline branch protection and required checks across orgs
Notes
This issue is the tracking epic. Follow-up implementation issues should link back here and include concrete evidence (logs/screenshots/report artifacts).
Reactions are currently unavailable
Metadata
Metadata
Assignees
Labels
enhancementNew feature or requestNew feature or requestsecuritySecurity planning and remediationSecurity planning and remediation