diff --git a/arcflow/main.py b/arcflow/main.py
index 3d503c0..b3d6903 100644
--- a/arcflow/main.py
+++ b/arcflow/main.py
@@ -745,6 +745,73 @@ def _get_nontarget_agent_criteria(self, modified_since=0):
 
         return criteria
 
+    def _validate_solr_query_part(self, query_part):
+        """
+        Validate a Solr query part to prevent injection attacks.
+        
+        This validation protects against both shell command injection and 
+        Solr-specific query injection attacks. While the current code only uses
+        internally-controlled strings, this defense-in-depth approach prevents
+        future security issues if user-controlled data is added.
+        
+        Args:
+            query_part (str): A single query part to validate
+            
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if the query part appears safe, False otherwise
+        """
+        if not isinstance(query_part, str):
+            return False
+        
+        # Reject empty or whitespace-only strings
+        if not query_part.strip():
+            return False
+        
+        # Check for suspicious patterns that could indicate injection attempts
+        # This includes both shell injection and Solr-specific patterns
+        suspicious_patterns = [
+            # Shell/command injection patterns
+            r';\s*\w',          # Semicolon followed by word character
+            r'\$\{',            # Variable interpolation attempts (e.g., Log4Shell)
+            r'`',               # Command substitution
+            r'\|\|',            # Shell command chaining (|| operator)
+            r'&&\s*[a-zA-Z]',   # Shell command chaining (but allow Solr AND operator)
+            
+            # Solr-specific injection patterns
+            r'\{!',             # LocalParams injection attempts (e.g., {!type=xmlparser})
+            r'<script',         # XSS attempts
+            r'javascript:',     # JavaScript protocol handler
+            r'<\s*iframe',      # iframe injection
+        ]
+        
+        for pattern in suspicious_patterns:
+            if re.search(pattern, query_part, re.IGNORECASE):
+                self.log.error(f"Rejected suspicious query part: {query_part}")
+                return False
+        
+        return True
+    
+    def _validate_solr_field_name(self, field_name):
+        """
+        Validate a Solr field name to prevent injection attacks.
+        
+        Args:
+            field_name (str): A field name to validate
+            
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if the field name appears safe, False otherwise
+        """
+        if not isinstance(field_name, str):
+            return False
+        
+        # Field names should only contain alphanumeric characters, underscores, and hyphens
+        # This is stricter than Solr's actual requirements but provides better security
+        if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$', field_name):
+            self.log.error(f"Rejected invalid field name: {field_name}")
+            return False
+        
+        return True
+
     def _execute_solr_query(self, query_parts, solr_url=None, fields=['id'], indent_size=0):
         """
         A generic function to execute a query against the Solr index.
@@ -765,6 +832,18 @@ def _execute_solr_query(self, query_parts, solr_url=None, fields=['id'], indent_
         if not solr_url:
             solr_url = self.solr_url
 
+        # Validate all query parts before constructing the query
+        for part in query_parts:
+            if not self._validate_solr_query_part(part):
+                self.log.error(f"Query validation failed for: {part}")
+                return []
+        
+        # Validate all field names
+        for field in fields:
+            if not self._validate_solr_field_name(field):
+                self.log.error(f"Field name validation failed for: {field}")
+                return []
+
         query_string = " AND ".join(query_parts)
         self.log.info(f"{indent}Executing Solr query: {query_string}")